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The recession that began in Japan in the late-1980s was first defined as a ‘lost decade’; but has 
now extended into a third decade. However, despite the downturn in manufacturing exports in the 
1990s, exports from the ‘cultural industries’ increased. ‘Export amounts and income from…culture-
related products and services more than tripled from a combined total of nearly Y2,539 billion (US$25.4 
billion) by 2006’1. ‘In 2003, anime alone was a five-billion-dollar business, over three times the 
value of Japanese steel exports to the United Sates. This market has continued to grow rapidly; the 
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) reports that Japanese anime DVD exports to the United 
States had increased dramatically from 2.1 million units in 2000 to 12 million units in 2005 [and] 60 
percent of all cartoon shows on television throughout the world [are] made in Japan2. However, as 
these figures indicate, while Japanese ‘cultural products’ are experiencing an unprecedented ‘boom’ in 
international markets, this paper asks how does the film industry (in the historical sense of cinema) fit 
into the equation?
In 2012 two English language books were published focusing on the ‘global’ and ‘transnational’ 
aspects of Japanese filmmaking – Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano’s Japanese Cinema in the Digital Age 
and Yoshiharu Tezuka’s Japanese Cinema Goes Global: a Filmmakers Journeys. While both books 
provide fascinating insights into Japanese films and the industry predominantly in relation to the 
export market, neither dwells on issues relating to the domestic market for which increasingly the 
majority of Japanese films are made. In 2011 Japanese film exports accounted for a mere 4.6% of the 
total box-office earnings3. In this research, I am attempting to redress this imbalance by examining 
changes within the industry in Japan at the turn of the century that have resulted in a strengthening of 
domestic filmmaking for domestic audiences at a time when other East Asian film industries, namely 
China and South Korea, are increasingly and aggressively seeking audiences abroad. Furthermore, 
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taking up Graeme Turner’s premise that changes in industrial structures produces textual effects4 I 
am also concerned to focuses on various issues in relation to contemporary Japanese film content. In 
particular, I am interested in the place of the auteur in the contemporary industry.
In this research, I am concerned with how structural changes within the industry have 
contributed to the fact that contemporary Japanese films receive little international critical acclaim, 
(Kore’eda Hirokazu withstanding). This point was highlighted by Kenzō Horikoshi in his 2011 article 
‘The Place of Japanese Film in the Global Age’ (Gurōbaru jidai ni okeru Nihon eiga no yukue). This, 
I think, is particularly relevant when one considers the international recognition afforded Japanese 
independent films in the 1960s, and early 1970s. In short, in this research I am exploring how ‘film’, 
politics, and the market interact. In terms of politics, internationally certain cinematic traditions 
are seen as symbolic of national identity and ‘soft power’ in Joseph Nye’s terms. It is precisely at 
this juncture where political considerations confront the market through such institutions as the 
Japan Foundation and JETRO in their attempts at gaining foreign distribution for Japanese films at 
international film festivals amongst other initiatives.
The promotion of Japanese cultural products for export formed part of a package of 
conservative, government policies relating to ‘marketization’ part of which included a major 
restructuring of domestic employment practices from the vaunted ‘cradle to grave’ system of the post-
war compact to more precarious structures. The deregulation of the media in the 1990s accompanied 
digitalization and included the break-up and privatisation of the telephone network NTT. Japan turned 
off the analogue television system and switched to digital on 24 June, 2011. However, digital was 
first available in Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka from 2003 and was available throughout the country by 
2006. These restructuring policies in the telecommunications and media industries were in line with 
international trends, as Hesmondhalgh argues; 
governments altered their telecommunications and broadcasting policies in the 1980s and 
1990s to encourage the development of the commercial cultural industries by privatising public 
corporations and “loosening” the regulation of media and culture5.
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the cultural industries, has been keen to 
capitalize on what Douglas McGray described, in his influential article of 2002, as a growing sense of 
Japan’s ‘Gross National Cool’. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Asō Tarō, made a speech in April 
2006 in which he proposed building a partnership between the Ministry and the ‘creative industries’. 
He is quoted as saying; ‘I think we can safely say that any kind of cultural diplomacy that fails to 
take advantage of pop culture is not really worthy of being called cultural diplomacy’. He continued, 
speaking of a need for an ‘all Japan partnership between Japan’s public and private sectors to market 
Japanese contemporary culture’. He explained that the Ministry would work on a ‘framework through 
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which content originating in Japan can more easily be spread around the globe’6. Historically, the 
Japan Foundation has been central to the promotion of Japanese ‘soft power’ through the promotion of 
Japanese cultural industries in the international arena.
Concurrently with the expansion of Japan’s cultural industries in the international arena, in 
the 1990s, throughout East Asia media industries underwent huge structural changes. As with Japan, 
these changes were prompted by international agreements (such as the founding of the World Trade 
Organisation in 1995 and the signing of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights in 1994), and similarly included the privatisation of telecommunications industries, 
and the ‘loosening’ of regulations governing the media. ‘The US pressured South Korea to drop its 
screen quotas as part of the 1998-99 negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty’7. And in 2006, the 
South Korean government reduced its screen quota again as part of a Free Trade Agreement with the 
USA8. China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001 and that same year, ‘the National People’s 
Congress ratified the concept of cultural industries (wenhua chanye). At this stage…the concept 
embodied the Chinese leadership’s aspiration not only to develop its big companies in the area of film, 
television, publishing, crafts and tourism, but also to maintain control9. Furthermore, as Davis and Yeh 
argue, these globalising trends combined with advances in digital technology opened up East Asian 
markets to Western multinational media companies such as News Corp; Star TV being a case in point, 
beginning transmission to Asia in 1991. Drawn by this huge potential market, CNN, BBC, MTV, HBO 
and Disney have all been lured into Asian broadcasting10. In response to these intrusions into domestic 
markets and as a bid to capitalize on their own cultural/creative industries, in the late 1990s and 
2000s East Asian governments shifted the emphasis of their policies from protectionism to the active 
promotion of their film and content industries. In the case of mainland China, Barr states:
In July 2010 the government issued a major directive to promote the competitiveness of China’s 
cultural industry. A Plan to Reinvigorate the Culture Industry set out plans to form a culture 
industry investment fund, financed by central government with support from state-owned 
cultural enterprises and China’s leading financial institutions11.
As with China, the South Korean film industry ‘has been and continues to be tightly controlled by 
the South Korean government’12 and has been similarly expanding its support for the film industry, 
through the establishment of the Korean Film Academy as early as 198413 and the founding of the 
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Korean Film Council (KOFIC). In more recent times, the focus is shifting to including co-productions, 
through the planned development of the Global Studio, to be built in the Busan Cinema Studio14. Six 
Global Studio buildings, outdoor sets and production support facilities are scheduled for completion 
in the early 2020s. This involvement of both the Chinese and South Korean governments in their 
respective film industries contains two aspects, on the one hand, there is the straightforward desire to 
make the local product competitive in the international arena, while on the other hand, and intimately 
linked to the economic, is the question of the protection, and perhaps more importantly the projection, 
of local culture and a ‘national identity’.
In the case of Japan, government interventions in the industry have historically been indirect 
(that is, apart from the infamous film laws beginning in 1939).  However, in 2002 the Agency for 
Cultural Affairs set up a series of meetings to consider how to promote and preserve the Japanese film 
industry. The meetings were attended by government representatives from the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications, and the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport. Also 
in attendance were representatives from the film industry the Motion Picture Producers Association, 
the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters, the Japan Association of Theatre Owners, and 
the Japan Council of Performers. Representatives from the Film Centre, then connected to the Tokyo 
Museum of Modern Art, were also included. From May 2002, the central committee divided into 
four sub-groups which met for a further four meetings to refine recommendations around production, 
distribution and exhibition, the preservation of Japan’s cinema heritage, and the education and training 
of industry personnel. 
A twelve-point plan for the revival of Japanese cinema was agreed. The following is 
summarized from a consultation paper published in the journal Kinema junpō No 1374 February, 
2003:  The committee justified the need for government intervention in the domestic film industry on 
the following grounds: First, acknowledging the one-hundred year history of Japanese cinema, the 
paper makes the point that as a ‘media art’ cinema is ‘mass’ by its nature. Therefore, over the years: 
Cinema has acquired two facets, while films are an entertainment commodity, they are 
also cultural products that contain the sentiments and ideas of a period. Films express the 
circumstances of a particular period and the culture of a country or region, while also indicating 
that [particular] culture’s specific characteristics15.
Secondly, in relation to national life, the paper argues that cinema is a good entertainment form in 
times of recession and in view of Japan’s ageing population provides a good form of inexpensive 
public entertainment. Thirdly, this is the age of ‘information technology’ and central to IT is the ‘image’. 
Historically, cinema’s links with the image place it at the centre of contemporary life. Regarding the 
preservation of early Japanese films, the paper stresses that these have value as part of Japan’s cultural 
heritage, but it also makes the point that early cinema is being re-appraised and has commercial value. 
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Fourthly, films are a means of promoting Japanese culture abroad. With the end of the Cold War, 
the paper reasons, various conflicts based on race, culture and religion are increasing throughout the 
world. The promotion of cultural understanding, it is suggested, will ease these conflicts. Hollywood 
is cited as an example of how cinema disseminated American cultural values to the world. And fifthly, 
this section concludes with an appeal for a policy to promote the national cinema industry in all its 
facets – the preservation of existing films, support for production, and support for distribution and 
exhibition both at home and abroad.
One of the effects of this shift in government policy, as it has emerged in critical debates in 
Japan, was a re-appraisal of the relationship of cinema to the nation state. Here we have the paradox; 
while at one level the transnational nature of the cultural industries is seemingly eroding national 
borders, the Japanese government is in part concerned to re-assess the efficacy of cinema as a means 
to promote domestic film as a vehicle to encourage cultural understanding and promote a ‘national 
identity’ on an international level. And this is where government policy as outlined in the discussion 
document is at odds with the reality. 
According to the logic of neo-liberal economies of production under which Japanese domestic 
films are now made (seisaku iinkai discussed below), only films that are viable by market criteria are 
produced. Ironically, Japan’s recent international commercial success with animation and gaming 
(both hardware and software) has been based on a policy of mukokuseki. Mukokuseki (the erasing of 
national identity from cultural products sold outside Japan) which, as Iwabuchi argues ‘simultaneously 
articulates the universal appeal of Japanese cultural products and the disappearance of any perceptible 
“Japaneseness”’16. This concept of Japanese software/hardware as having universal appeal through 
mukokuseki has come to dominate gaming and much anime as seen through the international success 
of Sony, Pokémon, Doraemon and some Studio Ghibli productions such as Howl’s Moving Castle 
(2005) and Ponyo (2008), and Katsuhiro Ōtomo Steam Boy (2004). However, in a world where the 
cultural industries are indeed increasingly ‘global’ in reach and ‘transnational’ in appeal, the Japanese 
commercial film industry is increasingly turning inward and relying on its large domestic audience 
for profits. This is in contravention to overall trends in East Asia which have seen the development of 
internationalized commercial cinemas in mainland China and South Korea. ‘By 2005 South Korea had 
become the fifth largest theatrical market in the world, with $890 million in box office receipts’17. Thus 
despite government policy aims to internationalise the Japanese film industry as a means to promote 
Japanese culture abroad as stated in the discussion paper, the much heralded revival of the Japanese 
film industry in the 2000s is primarily built upon loyal local consumption which raises many questions 
both in terms of how the Japanese film industry quantifies success, as according to Horikoshi, only 
one in ten locally produced films recoups its production costs at the box office18, and in terms of ‘quality’ 
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of content (here I am following Kinema junpō critics in defining ‘quality’ in terms of international 
‘critical acclaim’). 
Equally, Japanese investment in Hollywood in the 1980s did nothing to promote Japanese films 
in the international arena (Sony purchased Columbia Pictures for $3.4 billion, Matsushita purchased 
MCA-Universal for $6 billion). The aim of Sony et al was to become major players in the global 
media production system. Indeed, they were instrumental in making Hollywood ‘global’ in the sense 
used by Toby Miller et al in Global Hollywood 2.  ‘Their priority was thus to acquire globally popular 
content, regardless of its national origin, and they naturally assessed the “global popular” to be western 
in origins, not Japanese’19. As such, foreign films came to dominate the domestic market in the 1980s 
and Japanese auteur-defined filmmakers were forced to find funding from abroad. For example, Akira 
Kurosawa made Dersu Uzala (1975) funded by Mosfilm, Kagemusha (1980) was a joint production 
between Tōhō and Hollywood’s Twentieth Century Fox, and Ran (1985) was funded by a consortium 
that included the French producer Serge Silberman. Commenting on the Japanese film industry in the 
1980s Kurosawa laments: 
I feel that what’s wrong with the Japanese film industry today is that the marketing side has 
taken over the decision-making power on what film is going to be made. There’s no way that 
marketing-type people – at the level their brains are at – can understand what’s going to be a 
good film and what isn’t, and it’s really a mistake to give them hegemony over all this. The film 
companies have become defensive. The only way to compete with television is to make real 
films. Until this situation is corrected, it’s really going to be difficult for filmmakers in Japan20
As one round-table discussion published in Kinema junpō chaired by the film critic Hirō Ōtaka 
asked ‘is film a work of art (sakuhin) or a commodity (shōhin)’21. And this, in other words, is the nub 
of the question; in the post studio era the locus of production has shifted from creative individuals to 
the market as audience preferences studied through market research take precedence. This is not to 
argue that the studios did not carry out market research, but that now, through digital technologies and 
the increasing power of algorithms to predict and individualise spectator/audience preferences, the 
emphasis has shifted.   
After the protracted collapse of the studio-system of production in Japan starting in the 1960s, 
by the 2000s the economies of cinema had gradually shifted to a ready-made-hit ‘consortia system’ 
(seisaku iinkai) of production funding. This shift towards a post-studio ‘production consortia’ structure 
for the financing and production of domestic films in the 1990s has had a huge impact on both how, 
and which films are made. As Yomota explains:
Production consortia are constructed according to the enterprise; they are made up of publishing 
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houses, newspaper companies, advertising agencies and entertainment companies, but it is the 
television companies that have overall authority. The television companies, more than any of 
the other companies [that make up the consortium], have priority when it comes to marketing. 
Because they cover the whole country they spread the publicity and ensure profits. Investors 
are assembled based on information gathered through surveys of audiences’; the consumers’ 
demands (yōkyū) […] The screenplay writer and the actors are agreed upon, finally, a director is 
summoned. It has become a very rare thing for a filmmaker to put forward a project. Therefore, 
under this system Japanese films have gradually entered a [new] period of mass production22. 
Indeed, it is a structure that relies heavily on the domestic market. This is due in large part 
to both the use of popular manga, novels, and television series as the narrative basis for films, and 
the dominate position of the television companies within the consortia structure. These financial 
investment convergences within the cinema market between television, publishing, and film 
companies, have had a profound impact on film content and the role of the director/filmmaker as 
auteur within domestic production. In other words, a radical shift has occurred in the post-studio era 
from the promotion of the director/filmmaker as a publicity and advertising vehicle through critical 
notions of the auteur circulated through institutional and commercial agencies, to their displacement 
in favour of television stars, and the authors of the novels and manga series upon which the films are 
based.
In concluding, the tensions between commerce and creativity have always been a fundamental 
feature of the film industry. However, under the ‘consortia system’ of production this has become more 
pronounced. The dominance of this form of corporate production is such that for most filmmakers 
working in contemporary Japan, the most available employment relations are those where the ideas 
for films come from new professional intermediaries – the television companies and publishing houses 
– with filmmakers being employed to execute them. This situation has been confirmed in journals such 
as Kinema junpō which have carried on an often bitter discourse around issues of ‘quality’ which is 
seen to have been diminished as a result of the marginalisation of the filmmaker as creator in favour of 
the purely market defined approach of the new corporate structures of production.
（スタンディシュ　イゾルダ　ロンドン大学 SOAS  名誉教授）
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たものである。このことは 1960 年代および 1970 年度初頭の日本インデペンデント映画に対する
国際的評価を考慮するとき、とりわけ今日的な意義を帯びるだろう。すなわち、本論考が検討す
るのは、いかに「映画」、政治、市場が相互に作用しているかということである。政治の観点か
らいえば、国際関係上、ある種の映画的伝統は国民的アイデンティティのシンボルである、ジョ
セフ・ナイのいう「ソフト・パワー」であると見なされている。それはまさしく、政治的な思惑
が国際交流基金や日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）といった機関を通じて市場と対峙する結節点に
置かれているのである。にもかかわらず、2011 年の日本映画の輸出は、全興行収入のわずか 4.6
パーセントを占めるにすぎなかった。本論考では、世紀転換期に生じた日本映画産業内部の変化
が、ますます精力的に海外での観客獲得に乗り出している他の東アジア映画産業、すなわち中国
や韓国に対し、国内の観客を対象とした国内向けの映画製作を強化する結果を招いた日本のいき
さつについて考察する。さらには、産業構造の変化は言説に作用するというグレアム・ターナー
の仮説にもとづき、現代日本映画の内容に関する種々の問題点に焦点をあてたい。とりわけ着目
したいのは現代映画産業における「映画作家」の位置づけについてである。
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